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Bogging Down the Neighborhood:
 Social planning is urban planning with special 
emphasis on the social well-being of  a community. At the 
same time, the physical/social divide in urban planning 
places community-level social intervention at the margins 
of  the field. This paper examines the funding of  social 
service agencies through US Department of  Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) Community Development 
Block Grants (CDBG), in an attempt to highlight the role 
of  community participation in effective implementation 
of  urban policy.
 This paper analyzes the history of  the 
Community Development Block Grant with particular 
attention to the causes and consequences of  community 
participation and social service provision (defined broadly 
by HUD as education, child care, elderly, etc...). First, it 
looks at how community participation was shaped initially 
by the historical context and then by politics at the local 
and federal levels. Then, it examines social planning with 
particular attention to how community participation 
and the political context that influenced participation 
also influenced social planning as an anti-poverty and 
development strategy. It focuses on evidence that the 
variable components of  the program—social service 
provision, community participation, and the redistribution 
of  resources to low- and moderate-income persons—are 
interwoven in interesting ways. To do this, it examines the 
evolution and effectiveness of  community development 
programs from the 1950s through the 1980s and then 
explores the implications of  this historical context for 
current urban policy. 
Background and Social Context
 In the 1940s and 1950s the federal government’s 
main “community” intervention strategy was the practice 
of  urban renewal. The Housing Act of  1949 established the 
first federal urban renewal program with the objectives of  
eliminating substandard housing, stimulating development, 
and establishing suitable living environments (Anderson 
1964). Under urban renewal, the federal government seized 
blighted private properties through eminent domain. 
 For residents of  poor neighborhoods, urban 
renewal was synonymous with housing demolition and 
relocation. In theory, federal urban renewal should have 
seized property for the purpose of  public use, but in 
practice, it resold it to private developers for their benefit 
(Halpern 1995). When rebuilding occurred, it focused 
primarily on central business districts benefiting local elites. 
Urban renewal policies also reinforced neighborhood 
segregation along race and class lines by disproportionately 
dislocating African Americans. When seeking alternative 
housing, they were limited to areas immediately 
surrounding the demolished neighborhood because of  
racist restrictive covenants, housing discrimination, and 
lending discrimination (Anderson 1964; Hall 1996). 
 The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) was passed in 1974 and is a major 
source of  federal funding for urban social services. While social planning, e.g. planning with 
attention to community well-being, is often regulated to the margins of  the field, there is a 
relationship between the process and outcomes of  social planning for the effectiveness of  
urban policy as a whole. This paper reviews the implementation of  community participation 
and social service provision and finds that the incorporation of  multiple stakeholders is a key 
component of  effective participation and policy implementation. The differences in priorities 
between local residents, activists, service providers, and leadership should not be ignored. 
Social service provision became a dominant activity because of  the dominance of  service 
providers in community participation. This paper concludes by offering suggestions for urban 
policy in a renewed era of  participation. 
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 At the same time, urban planners were building 
high-rise public housing projects—in a sense recreating 
the poor neighborhoods they were destroying in other 
parts of  the city. Housing projects enforced tight income 
requirements as a means to ward off  fraudulent tenants 
(Hays 1995). This likely created high turnover (i.e., 
residents who became slightly upwardly mobile would 
be evicted) and may have been an additional social blow 
to these communities, eliminating leaders and creating 
instability (Hays 1995). Although planners believed that the 
physical attributes of  the buildings would be beneficial for 
building social ties, there was little about the structures that 
were not socially harmful (Halpern 1995). Corrupt local 
officials hired contractors who used shoddy construction 
practices for financial gains. Stigmatizing deficiencies, such 
as toilets without seats and elevators that stopped on every 
other floor, were found throughout (Hays 1995). Social 
service agencies attempted to provide services but often 
were unable to serve the entire population or address all of  
the social problems. The relationship between the social 
service providers and the local public housing authorities 
was tenuous; housing authorities were often reluctant to 
share control (Halpern 1995). 
 The 1960s could be characterized as a reaction 
to preceding policies at both the community and national 
levels. The failure of  federal housing policy—both in 
addressing the needs of  the poor and exacerbating social 
problems in poor neighborhoods—served as a catalyst 
around which neighborhoods organized as part of  the 
larger civil rights movement. Some organizers targeted 
local elites who profited from corrupt development 
practices. Others focused on the need for services to 
address the problems associated with these policies. As we 
will see below, the government often responded to activists 
by trying to appease residents, but rarely eradicated social 
problems. 
Early Foundation & Government Programs
 Initial responses to the context of  urban 
disinvestment came from private foundation initiatives 
rather than the federal government. With private funding 
sources, foundations had more flexibility to create new 
responses to social problems. The Ford Foundation, for 
example, planned and funded initiatives that experimented 
with community participation and social service provision. 
Two small federal programs, the Community Action 
Program (CAP) and Model Cities, grew out of  these 
foundation initiatives. Both foundation and government 
programs lead the way for CDBG, a large-scale federal 
blanket program. 
 Foundation programming was a response to the 
growing awareness of  problems in poor communities 
and fear of  continued social unrest in the early 1960s 
and laid the groundwork for later War on Poverty 
programs (O’Connor 1996). Launched in 1961, The Ford 
Foundation’s Gray Areas Program aimed to revitalize the 
neighborhood as a social system (Ylvisaker 1963). The 
philosophy of  the Gray Areas Program, as outlined by 
Ford Foundation programmatic director Ylvisaker (1963), 
was to change neighborhoods socially with a “spirit” akin 
to “cool-headed generals and far-sighted diplomats” not 
“fiery patriots” (i.e., militant leaders) who should “give way 
to avoid…permanent civil war,” (4). Thus, it was clear that 
an attempt to create common welfare would come from a 
middle ground strategy rather than through radical means. 
But Ylvisaker also saw that social problems were ignored or 
exacerbated by the physical orientation of  urban renewal. 
Social services—especially those focused on education, 
employment, and the justice system—were therefore 
important aspects of  the Gray Areas Program strategy. 
He also saw the need to create “indigenous leadership and 
the spirit of  self-help” (4), but his examples of  indigenous 
leadership highlight the participation of  professionals 
in the city rather than community members of  targeted 
neighborhoods. 
 Mobilization for Youth (MFY) was another 
initiative funded by the Ford Foundation and others that 
addressed social problems in poor neighborhoods. MFY 
was similar to the Gray Areas Program in its assumptions, 
but its mode of  action—orientation towards community 
members—was quite different. Although its purpose 
was to improve social services and opportunities in 
neighborhoods to end delinquency, the program focused 
on organizing neighborhood residents in response to social 
issues that were important to them. This was significant 
in that it was the first initiative to encourage residents to 
define the agenda (Halpern 1995). 
 The Federal government responded by 
instituting the Community Action Program (CAP). 
Influenced by MFY, CAP required maximum feasible 
resident participation (Halpern, 1995). This emphasis on 
resident participation was a major shift in policy from 
the earlier Urban Renewal programs in which elites 
maintained control of  decision-making (Cole 1975). Local 
governments and social service organizations resisted the 
call for extensive participation because they wanted to 
maintain control over the local community action agencies 
(CAA; Halpern 1995). In 1966 after local leaders refused to 
comply, the House Labor and Public Welfare Committee 
passed amendments requiring that one third of  CAA 
boards be comprised of  poor people. Still, the poorest, and 
most disenfranchised were not on CAA boards. Activists 
and black militant leaders began asking for positions on 
the board. Although they were eventually accepted onto 
the boards, many scholars and activists have questioned 
the motives for their inclusion. Halpern believes this was 
an attempt to co-opt direct action oriented groups into the 
system of  social service provision. By helping to divert 
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these activist groups away from direct action and towards 
social service provision, the threat of  unrest was tempered. 
At the same time, some politicians argued that allowing 
poor people to guide the War on Poverty was like allowing 
the sick to run a hospital (Halpern 1995). Participation by 
area residents was a federal requirement that was met with 
a great deal of  resistance. When forced to comply with the 
legislation, the resistance became rhetorical—poor people 
were dangerous and ill equipped and must be pacified. 
 Model Cities, a second federal program, was a 
component of  the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan 
Development Act of  1966 that targeted disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. President Johnson originally proposed 
the program, but Congress passed it only after decreasing 
funding and increasing the number of  cities allowed to 
participate—effectively 
diluting the program’s 
efforts. Model Cities 
was the first to include 
social and economic 
improvements along with 
physical improvement, 
making it substantially 
different from previous 
legislation. Model Cities stressed community participation, 
but not to the extent required in CAP (Nathan, Dommel, 
Liebschutz, & Morris 1977). It did not specify either the 
extent or manner in which community members should 
participate and because local governments received the 
funding, it left room for political elites to influence how 
community participation was executed (Cole 1975). 
Community Development Block Grant
 The Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) was authorized in 1974 after a two-year 
moratorium on federal housing programs in an effort to 
improve and repackage previous programs (Hays 1995). 
The CDBG program combined the following established 
federal grant programs: urban renewal, model cities, water 
and sewer facilities, open spaces, neighborhood facilities, 
rehabilitation loans, and public facility loans. CDBG aimed 
to simplify federal grant-making and increase flexibility 
of  federal funds at the local level. Although CDBG 
was less restrictive than the previous programs (termed 
“categorical” programs), it had the following requirements: 
a three-year community development plan, an annual 
program statement for community development, a housing 
assistance plan, citizen participation in implementation, 
information dissemination about implementation, and 
spending priority for low- and moderate-income families 
(Nathan, et al. 1977). Both urban renewal and Model Cities 
were influential in framing the community participation 
and social planning aspects of  CDBG. CDBG retained 
the language of  participation, but created a flexible 
environment that could easily thwart it.
 CDBG was part of  Nixon’s plan to overhaul 
federal approaches, yet it was not a decisive break from 
previous programs. Nixon subscribed to new federalism, 
an approach to government favoring a diminished role of  
the federal government especially in local policies. To meet 
the conditions of  new federalism, HUD sought a limited 
role in the implementation of  CDBG. HUD did this by not 
publishing a handbook interpreting the CDBG in the first 
years of  implementation. This approach was an attempt 
to foster flexibility in implementation at the local level, 
but it failed to anticipate the questions that would arise 
regarding implementation and eligibility. The legislation 
did not clearly define the role of  community participation, 
redistribution of  
resources, or the 




unsure about these 
r e q u i r e m e n t s 
(Nathan, et al. 1977). 
 In their analysis of  61 CDBG funded sites, Nathan 
and colleagues (1977) found that most local governments 
attempted to meet the requirements of  community 
participation as interpreted. However, even among those 
who believed citizen participation was important, there 
was wariness. For example, in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, 
city officials carefully fulfilled HUD expectations without 
raising the expectations of  community members about 
the benefits of  CDBG funding. Similarly, in Carbondale, 
Illinois, officials claimed, “citizens have neither the 
time nor the expertise for a very active role,” (Nathan 
et al., 1977, 424). They found that in every locality they 
examined either elected officials or government-employed 
professionals made the decisions about the role and power 
of  citizen participation. 
 Community participation looked quite different 
in various communities, but the following three dominant 
models were identified: public hearings, neighborhood 
meetings, and advisory boards. Of  the studied communities, 
thirteen localities relied solely on public hearings, which 
were typically held before drafting a CDBG application. 
Most often, community activists and organization leaders 
(Rimmerman 1985) attended public hearings. Seventeen 
localities held neighborhood meetings prior to holding 
a public hearing. The neighborhood meetings were a 
way of  informing residents about CDBG and gathering 
their input on neighborhood issues.  The public hearings, 
which followed, were held to get input on draft proposals. 
Neighborhood meetings had higher attendance than public 
“The federal government has the 
unique opportunity to reframe CDBG by 
emphasizing participation of residents of 
poor communities and a broader focus 
on addressing inequality.”
68 Agora’09
hearings. Finally, thirty-one localities relied on advisory 
boards as a form of  citizen participation. Advisory boards 
were more likely to represent the entire city, and less 
likely to represent members of  poor communities. Less 
than half  of  the advisory boards had a role in drafting an 
application. 
 Nathan et al. (1977) found that the attitudes of  
local officials towards community participation were the 
most influential factor in determining the extent to which 
community views were reflected in the grant process. In 
the first program year, those communities in which public 
hearings and neighborhood meetings were held had the 
most influential citizen participation (Nathan et al. 1977). 
This is significant because neighborhood meetings were 
also the easiest point of  access for unorganized citizens. 
 Cole (1975) argues that organizations become 
active in the decision making process to gain better access 
to funding sources (especially given the ambiguous context 
of  revenue sharing in CDBG). He therefore suggests that, 
through these organizations, communities have greater 
political power. Although Model Cities emphasized 
participation by residents of  target areas, CDBG removed 
this clause. Under CDBG, participation and control 
over decision-making 
closely resembled the 
CAAs. Instead of  area 
residents, community 
organizations and local 
leaders were invited 
to participate and 
accepted in hopes of  
getting federal money (Cole 1975). However, Cole fails to 
examine the extent to which these now active organizations 
advocated for residents of  the neighborhoods versus their 
own institutional gains. 
 As the political climate changed over the 
subsequent decades, so did community development 
legislation. Consistent with the Carter administration’s 
goals, which were more in line with the 1960s War on 
Poverty programming, the 1977 legislation renewing 
CDBG required a written plan for citizen participation 
and encouraged the participation of  residents in 
blighted neighborhoods and those with low or moderate 
incomes. HUD also established stricter guidelines about 
implementation in 1979 and published several handbooks. 
It also began examining CDBG grantees with much 
more scrutiny (HUD 1982). This increased role of  HUD 
in the new legislation should have increased community 
participation, but failed to do so.
 Community participation in decision-making 
increased as the legislation became institutionalized and 
community participants acquired more knowledge of  
the program, but the form of  participation changed 
(Dommel, Bach, Liebschutz, & Rubinowitz 1980). 
Advisory councils, neighborhood groups, and special 
interest groups dominated community participation. 
Members of  neighborhood and special interest groups 
continued to attend public hearings (Dommel et al. 1980), 
but records of  neighborhood meetings disappeared from 
reports. The most common approach to the increased 
federal regulations for community participation appears to 
be the inclusion of  advocates and leaders from community 
advisory boards. The form of  community participation 
allowing the least organized individuals to participate was 
replaced by more formal participation of  select members 
from advisory boards. 
 In the 1980s, more drastic problems with 
housing and neighborhood poverty became apparent. 
Homelessness emerged as a social problem, gaining 
national attention primarily because of  the change in the 
demographic composition of  the homeless population 
from single males to women and children (Hays 1995). 
Still, the Reagan administration reversed recent changes to 
CDBG, minimizing the federal role.
 This backdrop of  major social problems 
exacerbated by policy failings is reminiscent of  the 1950s. 
Yet this time, because of  the political environment of  the 
Reagan administration, 
subsequent changes 
in policy did 
not address the 
problems. Distressed 
c o m m u n i t i e s 
experienced more 
hardships in the 
1980s, but CDBG failed to meet the growing need. The 
amount of  CDBG spending decreased in comparison to 
community need (Rich 1991). 
 At the same time, more information about the 
implementation of  CDBG was available in the 1980s 
and as such, many began to critique the program. Some 
evaluators found that executive dominance in decisions 
about fund allocations diminished any incentive for 
community participation (Maier & Nachmias 1990). Lovell 
(1983) reviewed research on community participation and 
low income targeting, finding that low income targeting 
improved when HUD enforced it and community 
participation was strong. This implies that allowing more 
discretion at the local government level was detrimental to 
low income communities. Yet this is precisely the direction 
that the Reagan administration took with CDBG policy. 
While similar tensions existed in the 1980s as they did in 
the late 1960s, allies to community participation did not 
exist in the anti-interventionist federal government. 
Lessons from Community Participation 
 It is clear from this review of  the history of  
CDBG that local control plays heavily into the patterns 
“The tie between development 
programs in neighborhoods and funding 
community organizations can be traced 
throughout this history.”
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of  community participation. Hays (1995) points out 
that this issue of  local control was something that had 
political support from unlikely coalitions. Both local liberal 
officials and conservative federal officials were in favor of  
increased local control and diminished federal intervention 
into local and state politics. It was not until the 1980s, that 
local control became less favorable among liberal officials 
as the gap between citizen participation and local control 
became evident.
 While programs that preceded CDBG used 
methods that empowered communities, CDBG did 
just the opposite. By giving the more power to the local 
government, community participation (especially by 
residents of  poor neighborhoods) was marginalized. As 
neighborhood and social service organizations became 
the easiest, most common point of  access to the decision-
making structure, individual residents and activists were 
less likely to be involved in the process. Additionally, local 
control turned these organizations into advocates for their 
own self-interest. Organizations positioned themselves to 
advocate for funds to be allocated to their neighborhoods 
or organizations, but they had little control over larger 
local priorities. 
Social Planning and Social Service Provision
 For CDBG and the foundation and government 
programs immediately preceding it, social planning and 
social service provision was an important break from the 
problematic policies of  urban renewal. Social planning, 
e.g. neighborhood planning geared toward improving the 
social conditions, could encompass the provision of  social 
services, e.g., afterschool programs, but the plan should 
address the impact of  physical planning on social and 
economic conditions of  residents. However, social planning 
was not always carried out, leaving decisions about social 
service provision more susceptible to influence from social 
service agencies seeking funding. Although social service 
provision was an important innovation, its effectiveness 
was hampered because of  haphazard implementation. 
 The relationship between social planning 
and social service provision under CDBG can best 
be understood by examining the preceding programs. 
According to James L. Sundquist (1969), who helped plan 
the War on Poverty program as a member of  President 
Johnson’s poverty task force, the CAAs turned towards 
social service provision and away from integrative planning. 
CAAs continued to be controlled by local government 
officials and social service organizations. Early programs 
overlapped in neighborhoods diffusing this decision-
making structure. The Gray Areas Program, for example, 
encouraged localities to apply for federal CAP and Model 
Cities funding (Hays 1995). Social service agency leaders 
therefore became involved in all of  these programs. 
 With CDBG, social planning and social service 
provision was broadened. Social services could now be 
provided, not just for targeted neighborhoods, but also 
for whole communities. Although the legislation allowed 
for increased flexibility, the specifics of  social service 
provision were so unclear, and interpreted so differently 
by HUD officials at federal and local levels, that social 
planning was weakened. 
 While HUD legislation stated that social services 
“may be funded only if  they are essential to physical 
development projects, and further, only if  the jurisdiction 
had applied unsuccessfully for funding from other federal 
sources.” (p. 61 and section 105(a)(8) of  the act), the 
provision of  social services looked very different in each 
locality. Nathan et al. (1997) found that localities did not 
follow the regulations regarding social services. Most 
often they did not fund social services at all, and when 
they did, they followed a 20% ceiling for social services, 
which was proposed by the Senate but was not included 
in the final bill. Because a handbook was not issued, HUD 
would handle local questions by issuing public memos, 
which served as unofficial guidelines. As an example of  
misinterpretation, CDBG funds in a Texas community 
were allocated for the construction of  multipurpose 
service centers but not social service programming costs 
in a rigid interpretation of  the “physical development” 
component of  the legislation (Nathan et al. 1997). Despite 
HUD’s attempt to give local government more flexibility, 
local government still worried about the consequences of  
misinterpreting federal requirements (i.e., losing funding) 
and therefore did not use CDBG flexibility for improving 
social planning or social services.
The Relationship between Participation and 
Social Service Provision
 Cole (1975) finds that when community 
participation was allowed, cities spent a larger proportion 
of  their funds in such areas as parks and recreation, social 
services, health facilities, and other amenities. Advocacy 
groups, in particular, increased the proportions of  funds 
spent on social service provision. Dommel and colleagues 
(1980) found that allocations to social services were 
often a product of  community group influence as well as 
homeostasis (i.e., a program that had been funded stays 
funded). Without the specific call for participation by 
residents of  target areas, advocacy groups and community 
leaders dominated community participation. Their 
participation resulted in a bias towards social service 
provision. But because participation was still generally low, 
funding for social service provision declined during the 
first four years of  the CDBG program and the distribution 
of  social service funds to previous Model Cities 
neighborhoods declined from 40% to 25% (Dommel et al 
1980). 
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 Rosenfeld (1979) examined the transition of  
city community development plans from categorical 
programs to the CDBG. He found that plans differed by 
neighborhood type before CDBG implementation. For 
example, a Model Cities neighborhood was more likely to 
spend money on public services and less likely to spend 
money on physical infrastructure. Maier and Nachmias 
(1990) find that, in a city with an elite-dominated citizen 
advisory board, public entities were disproportionate 
recipients of  CDBG funds. Similarly, in several Michigan 
cities, expenditures for economic development and social 
services were related to local political characteristics 
(Rosenfeld, Reese, Georgeau, & Wamsley 1995). 
 Despite the hands-off  role of  the federal 
government in initial CDBG legislation, local experiences 
of  the program were quite opposite of  these intentions. 
Rosenfeld (1984) examined the perceptions of  “red tape” 
in the CDBG program among recipients. He found that, 
compared to previous categorical grants, many at the local 
level believed that requirements for bookkeeping and 
paperwork had increased. The irony is that the block grant 
program was designed specifically to reduce excessive 
bureaucracy. 
 This analysis reveals problems between the three 
levels of  decision-making—community, local government, 
and federal government. At each level, control was seen 
to be too strong at the other two levels and this control 
was viewed with distrust. Differences in control at the 
community level directly impacted the amount of  service 
provided. Changes in federal policy had significant 
impacts on funding social services. Most importantly, 
local discretion about community participation and 
interpretation of  policy was key in determining social 
service provision expenditures. 
Conclusion
 Community participation, defined broadly (using 
the HUD definition to include community groups as well 
as individual actors), consistently resulted in additional 
community services. Yet the dominance of  community 
service agency leaders in community advisory groups and 
in the later “citizen participation” process creates questions 
about the purpose of  this participation. It appears that 
these organizations were not necessarily advocating for 
the needs of  their community, but for the expansion of  
their agencies. This tie between development programs 
in neighborhoods and funding community organizations 
can be traced throughout this history. Early foundation 
programs and Community Action Program emphasized 
social service provision and the CDBG program retained 
this framework. 
 It is clear from this review of  the history of  
CDBG that social service provision and community 
participation are interwoven in interesting ways with 
the contradiction between local control and community 
control, constraining the program’s benefits to residents 
of  poor communities. Placing local officials in a superior 
decision making position to community members creates 
barriers to including community voices in the decision-
making process. Because organizational representatives 
are often self-interested, decisions about community 
needs are biased by the organization’s agenda. Community 
participation, which should have given residents a voice, 
allowed organizations to prevail instead. Thus, the process 
became less about local planning and more about obtaining 
grants for local organizations. 
 Finally, CDBG located the problem within 
poor communities, which ruled out an analysis of  the 
larger economic situation and therefore hampered its 
effectiveness. That is, instead of  targeting economic 
inequality, the program attempted to fix disinvested 
neighborhoods. This restriction put strict boundaries on 
the type of  activities that were fundable. Neighborhoods 
could get services and small development projects, but 
broader plans to address segregation, discrimination, 
or the political economy of  cities were not discussed. 
Citizen groups trying to advocate for their neighborhoods 
eventually became advocates for their organizations. As 
expected, attempting to alleviate broad economic social 
problems by providing social services to residents of  poor 
neighborhoods has done little to end the phenomenon of  
race and class segregation. CDBG has provided funds for 
communities for over 30 years, but in this time, poor urban 
neighborhoods have continued to decline.
Implications for a New Era of  Urban Policy
 According to his policy statement, President 
Obama plans to create an office of  Urban Policy, which 
will, among other things fund programs that can show 
results and fully fund CDBG (The White House, Urban 
Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/urban_
policy/). However, this policy statement does not address 
community participation. With the emphasis on proven 
programs at the federal level, CDBG may become much 
more federally controlled than in the years reviewed in 
this essay. Still, the Obama plan has the possibility of  
reinforcing two of  the problems associated with social 
service provision and social planning under the CDBG: 
lack of  local community participation and community 
organization participation focused on obtaining grants. 
 Although this administration is aware of  the 
history, CDBG is one area in which President Obama and 
his advisors should be prudent about understanding the 
past. The federal government has the unique opportunity 
to reframe CDBG by emphasizing participation of  
residents of  poor communities and a broader focus 
on addressing inequality. First, the federal government 
should produce a vision statement for social planning 
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that addresses inequality and require local decision makers 
to adhere. The next priority should be the inclusion of  
community members who are not affiliated with grant-
eligible organizations in the community planning process. 
A renewed focus on neighborhood meetings as a tool 
to encourage community participation may be the best 
avenue. In general, social planning and physical planning, 
together, should be brought to the forefront of  CDBG 
administration to avoid the local fight for control of  
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